Conclusion

Now that we know utilitarianism focuses on the results or consequences of our actions mainly by maximizing happiness is intrinsically good as it weighs all people's pleasures impartially then characterizing right acts in terms only of promoting the good and maximizing it. It’s time to write that paper.

Notes from - Thomas Hurka

The distinction between ‘good’ and ‘right’ in teleological theory

A teleological theory, along with identifying the good independently of the right, has the capability of recognizing many other goods other than pleasure, “including knowledge and artistic creativity, are, like pleasure, states of individual persons.” A teleological theory can recognize other goods involving patterns of distribution across persons, “such as that they enjoy equal pleasures or, on a different view, pleasures proportioned to their merit.” It can also recognize “the existence of beauty or of complex ecosystems, are independent of persons.” “These goods are consequences of acts that produce them, but other possible goods may not be. For example a theory that values difficult activities because they are difficult. Engaging in a difficult activity, “such as playing chess, will promote value not just by producing it as an external consequence but also by instantiating it, or by having difficulty as an intrinsic feature.” This also holds true for a theory that “values action from a virtuous motive, such as a benevolent desire for another's pleasure.” Thus, a benevolent act will add value through the intrinsic feature of it being benevolent.

This is one way a theory can be teleological and not consequentialist:

“If consequentialism can value only the external consequences of acts, as some definitions assume, then a theory fits the broader but not the narrower concept if it values some intrinsic properties of acts. It can still evaluate acts by the total state of the world that will obtain if they are performed, but some relevant features of that state are now internal to them.”

 

Abandoning the “impartiality about the good

A teleological theory can abandon the “impartiality about the good” component of utilitarianism. And with it altruism. A teleological theory can be egoistic, compelling individuals “to promote only their own pleasure, knowledge, or other goods, or, conversely, can say that they should promote only others' good and not their own.” It can also promote a sort of care ethics “what C. D. Broad called "self-referential altruism," which says that while we should care a little about everybody, our main concern should be close relatives, you know, friends and family.

These theories can still identify the good independently of the right and say right acts maximize the good, but if it is essential to consequentialism to be impartial, as again some assume, they are teleological but not consequentialist.”

 

A teleological theory can abandon the maximizing feature of utilitarianism.

The feature basically says that if you are not acting in a way that benefits others all the time you are not being moral. So rest, and relaxation could be off the table. One way out according to Michael Slote “is to replace the maximizing principle with a satisficing one that says an act is right so long as its consequences are good enough, either in absolute terms or because they make some reasonable proportion of the greatest improvement the agent can make in the circumstances.” While a satisficing principle could be consistent with consequentialism, if it is essential for a utilitarian theory to be maximizing then a satisficing principle would generate a nonconsequentialist teleology. Another way out is one proposed by Samuel Scheffler. Scheffler says that “to retain a maximizing principle but simultaneously grant agents an option to give somewhat more weight to their own good” thus if they would rather have “a smaller benefit for themselves to a somewhat greater one for other people, they do not act wrongly, though if they preferred the greater good, they also would not act wrongly.” However, the view that results from Scheffler’s theory probably isn’t consequentialist because it doesn’t only have principles about promoting the good; “but it arguably is teleological since its principles all do concern the good in some way.”

 

Eudaimonist theories - teleological ethics is broader than consequentialism.

The eudaimonist theories of Aristotle are teleological but not consequentialist. The eudaimonist derives moral requirements from a final end or good called a person's eudaimonia. Thus, eudaimonist theories are egoistic because each person's final end is simply that person's own eudaimonia. A major component of eudaimonia is moral virtue. Moral virtue expresses itself in virtuous acts, like helping others from benevolent motives.

While eudaimonist theories can in principle offer the same essential duties as utilitarianism, like “telling each person to maximize pleasure impartially”, the eudaimonist’s “explanatory claims do not use the causal relation central to utilitarianism, saying, instead, that acts of helping others are required because they can instantiate moral virtue, which in turn instantiates part of eudaimonia.”

 

Deontological theories tend to be nonconsequentialist and nonteleological

Teleological theories are usually compared with deontological ones. According to deontological ethics “an act can be wrong even if it has the best consequences.” A deontological theory would  argue that it is wrong to kill an innocent person even if murdering that person will prevent eight innocent people from being killed. This is because doing so would violate a moral restriction against killing. Deontological ethics can have restrictions “against lying, promise-breaking, etc.” Deontological theories are nonconsequentialist and nonteleological as long as there constraints are independent of the good, like an absolute law supporting automony and freedom and “independent, underived prohibitions against killing and lying.”

 

Thomists and teleological deontologists

Some deontologists connect constraints to the good. These are called Thomists. Thomists begin by “identifying certain states of affairs as intrinsically good, like, pleasure, knowledge, and freedom.” Alongside a duty to promote these goods, for the Thomist, there “is a separate and stronger duty to respect them,” this means not going against, or intentionally destroying, these goods. “This second duty grounds constraints against killing, which destroys good human life; lying, which aims at the opposite of knowledge; and more.” Thomist John Finnis claims that this view is teleological because “it is centered on goods that can and should be promoted.” This is not true of Kantian deontological ethics. Kant’s ethics grounds constraints in “respect for a value that is located in a person as opposed to being located in states of affairs. Also there is no need to promote this value because “there is no duty to increase the number of valuable persons.” Thomist deontology shares enough assumptions with teleological theories that it belongs in the category. Thus, “deontological ethics contrasts with consequentialism but not necessarily with teleology.”

In teleological moral theories all moral duties pertain to the goodness of states of affairs. Thus rejecting “claims about intrinsic goodness are unintelligible or who hold, with Kant (1998), that the fundamental value is that of persons.” However, the majority of philosophers accept the claim that “pain is evil and knowledge good, so there is at least some moral duty to prevent the one and promote the other.”

Can all duties can be related to the good

The main issue with teleological ethics “is whether all duties can be related to the good.” A teleological moral theory can value more than just pleasure. A teleological moral theory can also value “equal distribution and virtuous action.” A teleological moral theory can “allow or even require agents to give more weight to some people's good; and it need not demand maximization of the good.”

There is still an issue as to whether teleological ethics “can recognize moral constraints, which can make it wrong to do what has the best effects.” A strict consequentialist would either reject these constraints “or claim that belief in them is justified only insofar as it has good consequences.” However, “those who find constraints independently compelling will ask whether teleological ethics can accommodate constraints, as Thomist theories try to do, and, if so, whether it gives them the best explanation. If the answer to both questions is yes, then the teleological approach to ethics can capture a wide range of moral phenomena. If not, it will be unacceptable to those who think it sometimes wrong to do what will promote the most good.”

 

 https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/teleological-ethics